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1 Introduction
The matching technology is a popular tool among labor market specialists and macroeconomists. The
technology gives the number of jobs formed as an increasing function of the numbers of job-seekers and
vacancies. This function is generally well-behaved in that it is strictly concave and has constant returns
to scale. Such properties have strong empirical relevance (see Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001) and are
associated with good model outcomes, as with the independence of the unemployment rate vis-à-vis
workforce size, and the saddle-path and uniqueness properties of equilibrium under rational expectations.
Most of the time, the functional form of the matching technology is exogenous and can hardly be derived
from elementary principles. This is unfortunate as changes in the environment like public policies or
business cycles may a¤ect the matching technology itself. The problem goes beyond the labor market
case and arises whenever people must meet before trade activities take place.
Several papers provide an explicit scenario behind the aggregate matching technology. In mismatch
models, workers are imperfectly mobile between sub-markets, and the distribution of traders across sub-
markets governs the shape of the aggregate matching technology (see Drèze and Bean, 1990, Lagos, 2000,
2003, and Shimer, 2007). In stock-ow matching models, traders can only match with newcomers (see
e.g. Taylor, 1995, Coles and Muthoo, 1998, Coles and Smith, 1998, Coles, 1999, Gregg and Petrongolo,
2005, Coles and Petrongolo, 2008, and Ebrahimy and Shimer, 2008). In urn-ball matching models, buyers
independently send one buy order to each seller. As buyers do not coordinate, some sellers receive several
buy orders, while others do not receive any order (see e.g. Butters, 1977, Hall, 1977, Burdett et al, 2001,
and Albrecht et al, 2004, 2006, and Galenianos and Kircher, 2009, with multiple applications). Stevens
(2007) makes explicit the time-consuming nature of search and endogenizes search investments. The
resulting technology is CES.
As noted by Stevens (ibid), these papers rely on an implicit limited mobility assumption with an
associated coordination problem. Given that workers cannot readily transfer their attention from one
job (or sub-market) to another, lack of coordination generates frictions. However, another property is
also involved: matching frictions result from intratemporal congestion externalities. Traders on one side
of the market deteriorate search prospects for those who are currently on the same side, and improve
prospects for those who are currently on the other side. In this paper, I follow the general trend in
the rest of the literature as I assume that individuals have limited mobility between potential partners.
However, the source of market frictions is no longer contemporaneous. I examine the complementary
idea whereby matching frictions can result from informational persistence on the market about traders
who have already found a match. I refer to these traders as phantom traders, or phantoms for short.
Phantoms are a by-product of the search activity: when exiting the market, each trader may leave a trace
that disappears over time. Phantoms result in a loss of time and resources for future traders who want
to nd an adequate partner. I argue that a matching technology endowed with reasonable properties can
be derived from this single source of information imperfection.
There are various reasons why there may be phantom traders on the market. First, search strategies
display involuntary persistence. To recruit workers, rms post ads that convey information on job o¤ers.
Ads are very useful to attract potential employees, who can thus direct their search towards the corre-
sponding jobs. What happens to this information once a worker is recruited? The ad is likely to persist
for some additional time. This may be misleading for workers who lose time and e¤ort in prospecting
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a job that no longer exists. Similarly, workers send applications and register on websites. Firms may
process such applications or consult websites after actual recruitment. The example of monster.fr is
particularly enlightening. Ads last for one or two months, even if the position is lled in the very rst
minute. Firms benet from a price reduction when they pay for two months. On February 5 2010, placing
a single ad for one month cost 560e. The cost for two months was 650e. The phenomenon is probably
more pervasive for free websites where the site maker has fewer incentives to clean out old ads. Second,
match makers may voluntarily delay the moment they delete information about traders that have left the
market. Dating websites may keep online proles for months or even years after the person has logged
on for the last time. Estate agents may showcase sold or rented houses or ats. This strategy aims at
attracting customers by making the number of potential traders bigger than it really is. Third, matched
traders may be incited to go on searching even though they do not want to nd another trading partner.
Firms that have lled in their jobs may post ads to accumulate a stock of potential applicants in case
they have new vacancies. Married persons may enter a romantic online relationship without willing to
go further they certainly feel matched with their online partner, but what about this person? Finally,
on-the-match seekers can be considered as phantom traders from the perspective of the unmatched. Em-
ployees for instance contact alternative employers to put pressure on their current employer to grant a
pay rise. Doing so, they may create additional congestion for the unemployed.1
I consider a generic situation. Time is discrete and buyers and sellers try to contact each other on a
unique search place. To disentangle the impacts of phantoms on the search market from more standard
congestion externalities, I assume that each buyer meets one seller at most, and every trader on the
short side of the market is sure to meet someone. Unfortunately, that someone may be a phantom buyer,
or a phantom seller. No trade takes place in such cases. I assume that the populations of phantoms
obey simple ow-stock equations, the inow of new phantoms being proportional to the past outow of
successful traders. I examine the resulting matching pattern between the two populations of traders.
I refer to the aggregate matching technology as the phantom matching technology, or PMT for short.
The PMT features intratemporal and intertemporal externalities. Intratemporal externalities result from
the fact that an increase in the number of agents on the long side of the market reduces the proportion of
phantom traders. A larger proportion of contacts leads to matches as a result. Intratemporal externalities
imply that the PMT displays increasing returns to scale in the short run. Intertemporal externalities
result from the fact that current matches fuel future phantom traders. Although period-t number of
traders may have an ambiguous impact on period-(t+ k) number of matches, intertemporal externalities
combine so as to negatively a¤ect the current number of matches. Intratemporal and intertemporal
externalities balance each other, and the PMT features constant returns to scale vis-à-vis the whole set
of current and past traders.
The interplay between intratemporal and intertemporal matching externalities has two implications.
First, I discuss the stationary phantom matching technology (SMPT) that emerges as the steady-state
PMT of an environment where the populations of traders are themselves stationary. The SMPT obeys a
simple parametric form that depends on the entry rate of new phantoms and phantom death probability.
The SMPT exhibits constant returns to scale. The elasticity of the matching technology vis-à-vis the
number of traders on the short side of the market depends on the ratio of sellers to buyers (negatively
1The consideration of on-the-job search is of course not new. What is new is the assimilation of on-the-job search with
the more general phenomenon of informational persistence on matching markets.
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if sellers are on the short side, and positively otherwise). This elasticity belongs to the interval (1=2; 1).
Second, I examine the e¤ects of a temporary increase in the number of traders on the short side of
the market. Owing to short-run increasing returns to scale, the temporary shock generates a matching
boom in the short run. The matching boom then gives birth to phantom traders that alter the matching
pattern. As the boom stops, the market is left with many more phantoms and fewer matches take place
than prior to the shock. Matching probabilities gradually converge towards their steady-state values.
I further discuss the PMT through four extensions to the basic model. The rst extension is devoted
to the honeymoon e¤ect that benets new markets. New markets have no history, and feature no
phantoms. Matching probabilities start very high as a result. Then, phantoms accumulate and matching
probabilities deteriorate. The second extension considers another popular source of market frictions,
namely coordination frictions. This allows a distinction to be made between the respective contributions
of phantom traders and coordination frictions to overall matching frictions. The third extension examines
the empirical implications of the PMT. The discussion is based on a general model that admits the
standard Cobb-Douglas matching technology and the nonfrictional technology as particular cases. The
nal extension discusses the case of on-the-match search. I argue that on-the-match seekers can be
considered as phantoms in the PMT framework. This implies that phantoms and on-the-match seekers
are observationally equivalent. Consequently, papers studying the labor market and highlighting the role
played by on-the-job search on the aggregate matching technology provide indirect evidence in favor of
the phantom trader thesis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and computes the
resulting matching technology. Section 3 analyzes the interplay between intratemporal and intertemporal
externalities. Section 4 discusses the honeymoon e¤ect, studies the interplay between phantom traders
and coordination frictions, looks at empirical implications, and analyzes the case of on-the-job search.
2 The model
Time is discrete and denoted by t. A population of buyers and sellers want to trade with each other. But
they have to meet before trade takes place. Matching takes place every period. Every time a buyer and
a seller meet and agree on match formation, they exit the market.
Let B denote the (mass) number of buyers, S the number of sellers, PB the number of phantom
buyers, and PS the number of phantom sellers.
The matching mechanism involves two steps. In a rst step, each trader on the short side of the
market is assigned to a trader on the long side. This results in the following number of contacts:
min

Bt + P
B
t ; St + P
S
t
	
(1)
In a second step, matches are derived from contacts. The rule is that only contacts between non-phantom
traders lead to e¤ective trade. The number of matches is
Mt =
Bt
Bt + PBt
St
St + PSt
min

Bt + P
B
t ; St + P
S
t
	
(2)
The number of contacts is multiplied by the product of the two proportions of non-phantom traders. I
assume that phantoms cannot be distinguished from non-phantoms by the matching mechanism.
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Matching probabilities are
t =
Mt
Bt
=
St
St + PSt
min

1;
St + P
S
t
Bt + PBt

(3)
t =
Mt
St
=
Bt
Bt + PBt
min

Bt + P
B
t
St + PSt
; 1

(4)
The numbers of phantoms obey the following laws of motion:
PBt = 
BMt 1 +

1  B

PBt 1 (5)
PSt = 
SMt 1 +

1  S

PSt 1 (6)
with j > 0, and 0 < j  1, j = B;S. The inow of new phantoms is proportional to former matches.
The parameter j can be interpreted as the probability that a match gives birth to a phantom trader, or
as the relative search e¢ ciency of phantoms vis-à-vis non-phantoms. In the former case, j  1. In the
latter case, there are no additional restrictions on j . The outow results from constant depreciation at
rate j . Phantoms face a constant probability of dying j each period. Life expectancy follows a Poisson
law.
Proposition 1 In each period t, the number of matches is given by
lnMt = lnSt + lnBt   ln
"
Xt + t
1X
k=0
(1  t)kMt k 1
#
(PMT)
with
(
t = 
B , t = 
B and Xt = Bt if min

Bt + P
B
t ; St + P
S
t
	
= St + P
S
t
t = 
S , t = 
S and Xt = St if min

Bt + P
B
t ; St + P
S
t
	
= Bt + P
B
t
.
Proof. Suppose that min

Bt + P
B
t ; St + P
S
t
	
= St + P
S
t . This yields the following matching
technology
Mt =
StBt
Bt + PBt
(7)
We have
PBt = 
B
1X
k=0

1  B
k
Mt k 1 (8)
This gives
lnMt = lnSt + lnBt   ln
"
Bt + 
B
1X
k=0

1  B
k
Mt k 1
#
(9)
Now suppose that min

Bt + P
B
t ; St + P
S
t
	
= Bt + P
B
t . This yields the following matching
technology
Mt =
BtSt
St + PSt
(10)
We have
PSt = 
S
1X
k=0

1  S
k
Mt k 1 (11)
This gives
lnMt = lnSt + lnBt   ln
"
St + 
S
1X
k=0

1  S
k
Mt k 1
#
(12)
This closes the proof.
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The phantom matching technology (PMT) collapses into the usual non-frictional technology whenever
t = 0. The novelty comes from the inclusion of the weighted sum of former matches in the last term.
The weights depend on survival probabilities (1  t)k and entry rate of new phantoms t.
Market history may start at a nite date, say t = 0, without loss of generality. Equation (PMT) must
be modied accordingly:
lnMt = lnSt + lnBt   ln
"
Xt + t
t 2X
k=0
(1  t)kMt k 1 + t (1  t)t 1 P t0
#
(13)
where the relevant initial number of phantoms is P t0 =
(
PS0 if min

Bt + P
B
t ; St + P
S
t
	
= St + P
S
t
PB0 if min

Bt + P
B
t ; St + P
S
t
	
= Bt + P
B
t
.
The role played by market history is parameterized by t. As t tends to 0, phantoms are almost
innite-lived and old phantoms have a large impact on current matches. Conversely, with full depreciation
B = S = 1, phantoms live for one period and the PMT reduces to
lnMt = lnSt + lnBt   ln [Xt + tMt 1] (14)
3 Intertemporal vs intratemporal externalities
In this section, I examine the matching externalities featured by the phantom matching technology. The
combination of intratemporal and intertemporal externalities implies that the technology has increasing
returns to scale in the short run and constant returns in the long run. I study these properties in three
steps.
3.1 Intratemporal externalities
Proposition 2 Without loss of generality, assume that St + PSt < Bt + P
B
t for all t. In each period t,
(i) d lnMt=d lnSt = 1
(ii) d lnMt=d lnBt =
B
1X
k=0
(1 B)kMt k 1
Bt+B
1X
k=0
(1 B)kMt k 1
Proof. This results from direct computation.
The phantom matching technology has constant returns with respect to the number of traders on the
short side of the market. This property is typical of non-frictional matching models. Meanwhile, the
PMT has positive returns with respect to the number of traders on the long side. The reason is that
additional traders reduce the proportion of phantom traders. The more phantoms there are, the greater
the e¤ect.
Intratemporal externalities imply that the matching technology exhibits increasing returns to scale in
the short run. Indeed, d lnMt=d lnSt+ d lnMt=d lnBt > 1. The magnitude of increasing returns to scale
is parameterized by B (driving phantom births), B (governing phantom deaths), and by the history of
matching ows fMt k 1g1k=0 (fueling potential phantoms).
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3.2 Intertemporal externalities
Proposition 3 Without loss of generality, assume that St + PSt < Bt + P
B
t for all t. In each period t,
(i) @ lnMt=@ lnMt k 1 =   
B(1 B)kMt k 1
Bt+B
1X
k=0
(1 t)kMt k 1
(ii) d lnMt+k=d lnBt =
k 1P
j=0
(@ lnMt+k=@ lnMt+j) (d lnMt+j=dBt)
(iii) d lnMt+k=d lnSt =
k 1P
j=0
(@ lnMt+k=@ lnMt+j) (d lnMt+j=dSt)
(iv)
P1
k=1 (d lnMt=d lnBt k + d lnMt=d lnSt k) =  
B
1X
k=0
(1 B)kMt k 1
Bt+B
1X
k=0
(1 B)kMt k 1
Proof. Points (i) to (iii) result from direct computation. Point (iv) results from the fact that
d lnMt=d lnMt 1 =
P1
k=1 (d lnMt=d lnBt k + d lnMt=d lnSt k).
Former matches generate phantom traders. In turn, phantoms deteriorate the current matching
process. These intertemporal externalities imply that the whole market history a¤ects current matches.
Intertemporal externalities are characterized by points (ii) and (iii).
Current matches may positively or negatively alter future matches. To understand this property, I
consider the case where phantoms only last one period, i.e. B = S = 1. Then,
d lnMt+k=d lnBt = ( 1)k
k 1Q
j=0
BMt+j
Bt+j + 
BMt+j
(15)
The magnitude of this elasticity decreases with horizon period k. Its sign depends on ( 1)k, which is
negative for even k and positive for odd k. An increase in the number of period-t traders increases the
number of period-t + 1 phantoms, thereby reducing the ow of matches in period t + 1. For a similar
reason, this increases the ow of matches in period t+ 2.
Point (iv) shows that the sum of intertemporal externalities is negative. This compensates for the
positive intratemporal externality that is discussed in Proposition 3. Intratemporal and intertemporal
externalities combine so that the matching technology has constant returns to scale with respect to the
whole set of current and former traders.
3.3 Stationary phantom matching technology
I assume that whenever a buyer and a seller get matched they are replaced by a similar pair of agents.
I show that the phantom matching technology (PMT) converges towards a stationary technology, the
stationary phantom matching technology (SPMT).
The number of traders follows Bt = B and St = S for all t. The number of matches follows the PMT.
Without loss of restriction, sellers are on the short side of the market and
lnMt = lnS + lnB   ln
"
B + B
1X
k=0

1  B
k
Mt k 1
#
(16)
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Proposition 4 Let B + PBt > S + P
S
t for all t. The sequence Mt converges towards the stationary
number of matches
M = m (B;S) = B
 1 +
h
1 + 4B=B (S=B)
i1=2
2B=B
(SPMT)
Proof. In steady state, Mt =M and solves
BM2=B +BM  BS = 0
Resolution gives (SPMT). To establish convergence, note that Mt = BS= (B + Pt). This
implies that the sequence fMtg converges towardsM if and only if the sequence fPtg converges
towards P = BM=B . But,
Pt+1 =  (Pt) (17)
with  (x) = BBS= (B + x) + (1  )x. As  (0) > 0 and 0 < 0 (x) < 1 for all x  0, fPtg
converges towards P for all   0 and all  2 (0; 1].
The SPMT features standard properties. First, it is strictly increasing in the numbers of traders
on each market side. Second, it has constant returns to scale. This property results from the constant
intertemporal returns to scale discussed previously. Third, the elasticity of the matching technology with
respect to the ratio of sellers to buyers is " (S=B) =
2(B=B)S=B
 (1+4(B=B)S=B)1=2+(1+4(B=B)S=B)
2 (1=2; 1).
This elasticity decreases with

B=B

S=B. If buyers were on the short side of the market, the elasticity
would be decreasing in

B=B

S=B.
3.4 Dynamic implications
I consider a temporary increase in the number of sellers. This allows the results shown by Propositions
2 to 4 to be illustrated. From time t0 to time t1 > t0, the number of sellers goes from S to S (1 + ").
It then returns to S. Initial numbers of phantoms are set at their stationary numbers. I distinguish
three di¤erent matching technologies. In all cases, I consider deviations vis-à-vis the log of the stationary
number of matches lnM :
lnMt=M = lnSt=S + ln [B +M ]  ln
"
B + :5
1X
k=0
(:5)
k
Mt k 1
#
(PMT1)
lnMt=M = lnSt=S + ln [B +M ]  ln [B +Mt 1] (PMT2)
lnMt=M = ln
 1 + [1 + 4 (St=B)]1=2
2
  lnS   ln [B +M ] (SPMT)
In technology PMT1, half of the matches give birth to phantom traders and the depreciation rate is
50%, i.e. B = :5 and B = :5. This technology has unlimited memory. In technology PMT2, all
matches originate phantom traders, but phantoms only last one period, i.e. B = 1:0 and B = 0. This
technology has limited memory. The technology SPMT is the stationary phantom matching technology
corresponding to PMT1 and PMT2. This technology does not depend on former matches.
The stationary numbers of traders are B = 2:0 and S = 1:0. The shock consists of a 10% increase in
the number of sellers, i.e. " = :1. Initial numbers of phantoms are set at their stationary values.
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Figure 1: Changes in buyersmatching probability following a one-period shock. The shock takes place
at time t0 = 3. Initial conditions: S = 1:0, B = 1:0, Mt = M for all t < t0. Shock " = :1. Parameters
are B = :5 and B = :5 in the case PMT1, and B = 1:0 and B = 0 in the case PMT2.
I rst consider a one-period shock. The shock takes place at period t0 = 3. Figure 1 depicts the result-
ing trajectories of buyersmatching probabilities. With the SPMT, the matching probability increases at
the time of the shock, and subsequently goes down to its stationary value. The elasticity of the matching
probability with respect to the ratio S=B is about .7. With the other technologies, Proposition 2 shows
that the short-run elasticity of the matching probability with respect to S=B is one. This result explains
why the spike at the time of the shock is higher with PMT1 and PMT2 than with the SPMT. Changes
in the phantom proportion then alter the matching probabilities, which converge towards the SPMT.
The matching probability undershoots its long-run value at period t0 + 1 = 4. With PMT1, phantoms
die at a constant rate, and there is monotonic convergence towards the steady-state value. With PMT2,
phantoms only last one period. This implies oscillations of decreasing magnitude around the steady-state
value, as discussed after Proposition 3.
I then consider a ve-period shock. The shock occurs from t0 = 3 to t1 = 7. Figure 2 shows that
the phantom matching technologies rapidly converge towards the SPMT. This implies oscillations with
PMT2, and monotonic convergence with PMT1. Both technologies originate the same negative e¤ect in
period t = 8, that is once the negative shock has elapsed. Technology PMT1 compensates a low phantom
birth rate by a large survival probability. Overall, the stock of phantoms is the same for PMT1 and
PMT2 in t = 8.
These examples illustrate two general phenomena. First, the matching technology has increasing
returns to scale in the short run. The PMT magnies temporary shocks with respect to matching
technologies that have constant returns to scale in the short run. Second, the accumulation of phantoms
and the resulting negative intertemporal externality imply that matching probabilities fall below their
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Figure 2: Changes in buyersmatching probability following a ve-period shock The shock takes place
at time t0 = 3 and lasts until t1 = 7. Initial conditions: S = 1:0, B = 1:0, Mt =M for all t < t0. Shock
" = :1. Parameters are B = :5 and B = :5 in the case PMT1, and B = 1:0 and B = 0 in the case
PMT2.
stationary level after the shock.
4 Discussions
I discuss four aspects of the phantom matching technology (PMT). First, I argue that a new matching
place benets from a honeymoon e¤ect because there are no phantoms haunting the place. Second, I
augment the model with another source of matching frictions, namely coordination frictions. Third, I
turn to empirical implications. Finally, I compare the PMT framework to matching technologies that
account for on-the-match search.
4.1 Market birth and the honeymoon e¤ect
Given increasing returns to scale in the short run, a new market benets from a honeymoon e¤ect.
Without phantoms in the very beginning of market history, traders easily get matched. However, the
phantom stock grows and the matching technology deteriorates.
I consider the case where the total population of matched and unmatched agents is xed. This case
corresponds to the marriage market, with an equal number of men and women. Suppose that a new
marketplace opens. Then, N men and N women enter the market, with S0 individuals unmatched
(singles) and N  S0 matched (in couples) on each side of the market. Matched men and matched women
originate phantoms with equal probability , and phantoms of both gender die with equal probability .
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Figure 3: Parameters are B = :5 and B = :5 in the case PMT1, and B = 1:0 and B = 0 in the case
PMT2.
The initial number of phantoms is 0. Once matched, men and women enjoy the benets from being in
couple until they separate. The separation probability is q.
Populations of traders obey the following motions:
St = St 1  Mt 1 + q (N   St 1) (18)
lnMt = 2 lnSt   ln
"
St + 
t 2X
k=0
(1  )kMt k 1
#
(19)
In steady-state, St = S and Mt =M . This gives M = m (S; S) and S = (qN  M) =q. It follows that
M
S
=
 1 + (1 + 4=)1=2
2=
(20)
S = qN=
"
 1 + (1 + 4=)1=2
2=
+ q
#
(21)
I assume that the initial population of singles is the steady-state population, i.e. S0 = S. The total pop-
ulation N of each gender is normalized to 1. I consider the two matching technologies PMT1 and PMT2
used in subsection 3.4. PMT1 corresponds to  = 1 and  = 1. PMT2 corresponds to  = :5 and  = :5.
Figure 3 depicts the resulting patterns of the matching probabilities. These patterns feature the honey-
moon e¤ect. Without phantoms, the rst-period matching probability is one. The matching probability
subsequently falls and converges towards its stationary value.The honeymoon e¤ect may apply to various
match-making industries, as with online dating, real estate, or even temporary work agencies. This e¤ect
predicts that newcomers in those markets may build on their initial advantage and easily conquer market
shares in a rst step. However, they should su¤er from negative intertemporal externalities in a second
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step, leading to high mortality rates. The honeymoon e¤ect may also contribute to explaining why old
and established match makers are not necessarily very e¢ cient despite their experience and visibility for
the unmatched traders.
4.2 Phantoms and coordination frictions
I examine how phantom traders interact with an alternative source of market frictions. In the urn-
ball matching (UBM) model, agents on one side of the market try to contact agents on the other side.
However, they do not coordinate, resulting in coordination frictions. The PMT framework and the UBM
model complete each other so as to o¤er a rich description of market frictions.
Assume that each buyer, including phantoms, sends a buy order to one of the sellers, including phan-
toms. The probability that a particular seller receives a buy order from a particular buyer is 1=
 
S + PS

.
Where a seller receives multiple o¤ers, two cases must be analyzed. Either the seller can detect phantom
buyers or he cannot.
If the seller can detect phantom buyers, the number of matches is
M = S
"
1 

1  1
S + PS
B#
(22)
As B;S; PS !1, this gives
M = S

1  exp

  B
S + PS

(23)
This technology still features increasing returns to scale vis-à-vis B and S, as an increase in S allows the
phantom proportion on the sellersside to be reduced. In the long run, the SPMT is
M = S

1  exp

  B
S + SM=S

(24)
This equation implicitly denes M = m (B;S). The SPMT has constant returns to scale.
If the seller cannot detect phantom buyers, the number of matches is
M =
B
B + PB
S

1  exp

 B + P
B
S + PS

(25)
The corresponding SPMT is
M =
B
B + BM=B
S
"
1  exp
 
 B + 
BM=B
S + SM=S
!#
(26)
The implicit function M = m (B;S) also features constant returns to scale. The latter technology
highlights the contributions of phantom traders and coordination frictions to overall market frictions.
The term BS=

B + BM=B

captures the direct role played by phantom traders, while the term 1  
exp

 B+BM=B
S+SM=S

relies on coordination frictions. Coordination frictions themselves are parameterized
by the stocks of phantoms on each market side.
4.3 Empirical implications
The PMT can be confronted to labor market data. Without loss of generality, let buyers be the unem-
ployed and sellers be the vacancies, and consider the case where phantom traders are the only source of
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frictions. For simplicity, I consider the case where the phantom and non-phantom unemployed always
outnumber the sum of phantom and non-phantom vacancies.2
Assuming that (i) the number of matches that take place in t can only be observed in t+1, (ii) St the
number of registered vacancies is proportional to the actual stock of vacancies (that includes nonregistered
vacancies), and (iii) there is unbiased measurement error on the number of sellers/vacancies, the statistical
model can be expressed as follows:
lnMt+1 = 0 + 1 lnSt + 2 lnBt   3 ln
"
Bt + 
KX
k=1
(1  )kMt k
#
+ !t (27)
where !t is the error term. The number of lags has been arbitrarily limited to some constant K  1 so
that the model can be estimated. When K = 1, parameters  and  cannot be identied and phantoms
last one period. The constant 0 is due to the fact that St does not measure the total number of vacancies.
The model (27) allows the PMT to be tested against popular alternatives. When 1 = 1 2 > 0 and
3 = 0, the matching technology is Cobb-Douglas with constant returns to scale. When 1 = 1, 2 = 3
and  = 0, matching is non-frictional and the number of matches equals the number of vacancies. Finally,
the PMT results when 1 = 2 = 3 = 1 and  > 0.
Of course, I do not expect the restrictions 1 = 2 = 3 = 1 and  > 0 to hold. The PMT abstracts
from many other sources of matching frictions that have been emphasized in the literature, like geographic
and skill mismatch or coordination frictions. Adding those various complementary matching frictions
would modify the theoretical matching technology, and the resulting technology could be compatible,
for instance, with 1, 2, and 3 di¤ering from one. However, the key particularity of the PMT is
the presence of the lagged numbers of matches among the explicative variables. These variables must
negatively a¤ect the current number of matches, creating the type of dynamic externalities emphasized
in this paper.
In addition to alternative sources of market frictions, I could consider alternative technologies of
phantom formation / dissolution. The phantom stock obeys a linear dynamic equation, i.e. current
phantom stock equals former stock minus depreciation plus new phantoms. A more general formulation
would be
Pt = f (Mt 1; Pt 1) (28)
Additional restrictions need to be imposed on function f . First, f must be increasing in the number
of matches Mt 1 and in the former phantom stock Pt 1. Second, to avoid the phantom stock growing
to innity, the partial derivative with respect to Pt 1 must be less than one. Moreover, f must have
constant returns to scale. Indeed, the stationary number of phantoms solves P = f (M;P ). Owing to the
fact that 0 < fP < 1, P can be expressed as an increasing function of the stationary number of matches
M . That is P = g (M). The SPMT can be written
M =
BS
B + g (M)
(29)
The PMT has constant returns to scale if and only if g (M) = Mg (1). Put otherwise, g must be linear
in M . In turn, this restriction implies that f must have constant returns to scale.
2 If this condition were not satised the estimation technique would have to take into account the regime change that
may occur when the short side of the market becomes the long side.
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Alternative technologies of phantom formation would a¤ect model (27). The sequence fMt kgKk=1
would enter in a non-additive way. However, the key property of the PMT would be preserved: former
matches diminish the number of current matches.
4.4 Phantoms and on-the-match search
On-the-match seekers form a particular type of phantom traders. In this subsection, I make two points.
On the one hand, the PMT is a natural framework to analyze on-the-match search. On the other hand,
usual empirical strategies to account for on-the-job search fail to distinguish on-the-job seekers from other
types of phantom traders.
On-the-match search occurs when matched traders go on searching for alternative partners. They
may do so for various reasons largely discussed in the literature, as with expanding their information set,
changing partner, or bargaining a larger share of match surplus. On-the-match seekers may alter the
search of unmatched agents through congestion or crowding-out e¤ects.
On-the-match search is usually captured as follows. Let E denote the number of matched traders. The
number of matches between unmatched traders is em (B;S;E). The dependence vis-à-vis E is typically
nonpositive.
Adopting the terminology in use in this paper, on-the-match seekers can be seen as phantoms. Here-
after, the total population of matched and unmatched agents are NBt = Bt+Et and N
S
t = St+Et, where
Et denotes the total number of matched agents. Matched agents separate with probability q. There are
no other phantoms than matched agents.
I assume that matched agents always go on searching for alternative partners. This may be so as to
improve their information on the distribution of potential partners, or to increase their share of match
surplus through alternative o¤ers and countero¤ers. I also assume that matched agents provide  e¢ cient
units of search. In the PMT framework, this corresponds to B = S =  and B = q. The PMT is
lnMt+1 = lnSt + lnBt   ln
"
Bt + 
1X
k=0
(1  q)kMt k 1
#
(30)
By denition, the total number of matches is the sum of all former matches weighted by the probability
that they have not separated. Therefore, Et =
1X
k=0
(1  q)kMt k 1 and
lnMt+1 = lnSt + lnBt   ln [Bt + Et] (31)
The matching technology directly derives from the PMT. As such, it features intratemporal increasing
returns to scale vis-à-vis B and S. It also has intertemporal constant returns to scale once the negative
dependence vis-à-vis Et is taken into account.
There is observational equivalence between phantoms and on-the-match seekers. This statement casts
doubt on the interpretation of estimated matching technologies that explicitly account for on-the-job
search. The general problem is that the number of phantoms is correlated with recent hires. The fact
that traders of the past a¤ect current recruitments does not prove that employees create congestion e¤ects
for the unemployed. This may also result from the type of informational persistence that is advocated in
this paper.
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Suppose for instance that there are two types of phantoms: on-the-match seekers and regular phan-
toms. The birth rate of regular phantoms is R, while the dying rate is R. Similarly, a matched person
seeks with search intensity O, while the match destruction probability is q. The PMT is
lnMt+1 = lnSt + lnBt   ln
"
Bt + 
O
1X
k=0
(1  q)kMt k 1 + R
1X
k=0

1  R
k
Mt k 1
#
(32)
Focusing on the labor market case, the parameter q can be identied using data on separation rates.
However, I cannot identify parameters O and R. I may try to use data on job-to-job movements to
control for the e¤ects of on-the-job seekers. However, this strategy is misleading. On the one hand, many
employed job-seekers do not want to change jobs but are seeking an alternative o¤er so as to pressure
their current employer into making a countero¤er. On the other hand, employed job-seekers do not
necessarily compete with the unemployed. Many of them seek jobs that are only available to already
employed people - that is, they search for jobs on a di¤erent search place.
A key di¤erence between phantom traders and on-the-match seekers is the fact that phantoms consist
of a backward variable, while part of on-the-match seekers consist of a forward variable. Burgess (1993)
and Anderson and Burgess (2000) argue that a large proportion of employees do not seek jobs. The
proportion that seeks jobs is actually procyclical.3 However, phantoms may also adapt to changing
market conditions. Parameters  and  may be endogenous, reecting the behavior of match-makers as
well as the behavior of job-seekers. I leave the corresponding extensions for future work.
5 Conclusion
This paper shows that information persistence on search markets can generate market frictions, and that
such market frictions give birth to a matching technology that has convenient properties from an applied
perspective. The key idea is that each new match gives birth to a pair of phantom traders. In turn,
phantom traders haunt the search place for some random period, inducing wasted resources spent by
unmatched traders that desperately try to contact them. The resulting aggregate matching technology
features increasing returns to scale in the short run, and constant returns in the long run.
The research can be extended in two directions. First, one may endogenize the parameters that govern
phantom death. Match makers may spend time and money to clean their websites or to advertise for
available trade partners. Non-phantom traders may send signals to be distinguished from phantoms.
Second, the interplay between intra and intertemporal externalities should have implications for turnover
externalities. Match formation is unlikely to account for phantom birth. Similarly, match destruction
should not be a¤ected by phantom proportion reduction.
3See Sunde (2007) for a discussion on the implications of endogenous search behavior.
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